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ABSTRACT 
At the beginning some results from the field of 
graph theory are presented. Next we show how to 
share a secret that is proper n-coloring of the 
graph, with the known structure. The graph is 
described and converted to the form, where colors 
assigned to vertices form the number with entries 
from Zn. A secret sharing scheme (SSS) for the 
graph coloring is proposed. The proposed method 
is applied to the public-key cryptosystem called 
“Polly Cracker”. In this case the graph structure 
is a public key, while proper 3-colouring of the 
graph is a private key. We show how to share the 
private key. Sharing particular n-coloring (color-
to-vertex assignment) for the known-structure 
graph is presented next. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Problems of proper vertex coloring for an 
arbitrary graph, with minimal set of colors are 
known to be NP [10]. Decisions problems 
about the graph coloring (e.g., on the graph 
chromatic number) are of NP class as well. 
Even simple problems like finding a 3-
colouring for 3-colourable graph are known to 
be NP-hard. The latest is used in the graph 
based implementation of the public-key 
cryptosystem “Polly Cracker”.  
Public-key cryptography was pioneered by 
Diffie and Hellman [4]. Other important 
contributions came from (to name a few): 
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [14] proposed 
RSA cryptosystem, ElGamal [5] build 
cryptosystem using the discrete logarithm 
problem, Koblitz [9] constructed public-key 
cryptosystem using elliptic curves. The public-
key (asymmetric) cryptosystems use two 
different keys, opposed to private-key 
(symmetric) cryptosystems. In the private-key 
cryptosystems knowledge of one of the keys 
(nevermind, encryption or decryption)  allows 
determination of the other from the pair, while 
in public-key cryptosystems knowing one of 
the keys, does not allow to determine the 
other. So, the keys are asymmetric, that allows 
to publish one key (public key) without 
compromising the other one (private key). 
Such algorithms provide much greater 
flexibility than traditional symmetric 
cryptosystems. They have two possible modes 
of operation:  
a. Secrecy: message encrypted with the public 
key, can be decrypted only by the private 
key holder, hence message (plaintext) is 
kept secret and protected; 
b. Authenticity: only private key holder can 
encrypt the message m, that can be read by 
anyone using the public key, hence identity 
of the private key holder is authenticated 
(protected).  
Split control of the keys yields additional 
features for public-key cryptosystems. It can 
be implemented by means of secret sharing. 
Consider two instances with applications to 
both operation modes of the public-key 
cryptosystem:  
a. Sharing the private key. The authorized 
entities must cooperate to recover the 
private key. Secrecy: message m encrypted 
using the public key can be decrypted only 
once the private key is recovered. 
Authenticity: recovered private key is used 
to encrypt the message. Hence, with the 
help of the public key it is possible to carry 
out authentication procedure and prove that 
message was encrypted by the authorized 
entities. 
b. Sharing the public key. Various 
modifications of secret sharing schemes can 
be used (see [11]). To illustrate the point 
consider pre-positioned secret sharing 
schemes. In [11] such schemes were 
defined as follows : „All necessary secret 
information is put in place excepting a 
single (constant) share which must later be 
communicated, e.g. by broadcast, to 
activate the scheme”. Secrecy: message m 
can be encrypted only when the public key 
is known. Authenticity: again message m 
encrypted using the private key can be 
authenticated only when the public key is 
recovered. 
 Thus, it is possible to design structures 
with various level of openness and privacy. In 
the broader perspective, split control of the 
keys in the public-key cryptosystems can be 
seen as the new paradigm that sets 
intermediate states between two opposite 
realms of public and private. Such structures 
can find applications not only, where the 
public-key cryptosystems and secret sharing 
are applied nowadays. Combined, can enter 
fields like: managing complex processes on 
the financial markets or multiparty decisions 
in the corporate governance field. 
 The secret sharing allows splitting a secret 
into different pieces, called shares, which are 
given to the participants. Only certain group 
(the authorized set of participants) can recover 
the secret. Secret sharing schemes were 
independently invented by George Blakley [2] 
and Adi Shamir [15]. Many schemes were 
presented since, for instance: Asmuth and 
Bloom [1], Brickell [3], Karin-Greene-
Hellman (KGH method) [7].  
Since the last one will be used in the 
examples through the paper, its description is 
provided below.  
KGH is a simple and elegant method with 
striking similarity to the Vernam cipher, see 
[7]. The secret is a vector of  numbers η{ }ηη sssS ,...,, 21=
k >
. Some modulus k is chosen, 
such that . All t 
participants are given shares that are -
dimensional vectors  with 
elements in Z
)
,...,2
,...,,max( 21 ηsss
jS j ,1,)( =η
η
t
k. To retrieve the secret they have 
to add the vectors component-wise in Zk. 
   For  k = 2, KGH method works like ⊕ 
(xor) on -bits numbers, much in the same 
way like Vernam one-time pad. If t 
participants are needed to recover the secret, 
adding t-1 (or less) shares reveals no 
information about secret itself. Interesting 
feature of KGH is that when certain vectors 
 are excluded (not allowed) from the set of 
possible secret values, method remains equally 
secure. Again, having t-1 parts (or less) of the 
secret reveals no information about the secret 
itself. KGH with excluded vectors is referred 
as KGHe. Certainly, for same  (vector 
length) the cardinality of the “secret space” is 
smaller for KGHe than for KGH. 
η
*
ηS
η
   In practice, it is often needed that only 
certain specified subsets of the participants 
should be able to recover the secret. The 
authorized subset is a subset of secret 
participants that are able to recover secret. The 
access structure describes all the authorized 
subsets. To design the access structure with 
required capabilities, the cumulative array 
construction can be used, for details see, for 
example, [6]. Combining cumulative arrays 
with KGH method, one obtains an 
implementation of the general secret sharing 
scheme (see, e.g., [12]). While designing such 
an implementation, one can introduce required 
capabilities not only in terms of the access 
structure but also others, like security (e.g., 
perfectness), see [11], [17]. 
The outline of the paper is the following: 
Section 2 briefly summarizes results from 
graph theory needed further in the paper. First 
procedure to convert any graph into the form 
convenient for the secret sharing (see section 
2.1) is given, then graph n-coloring results 
needed further in the text are presented. In 
section 3 we describe graph coloring based 
implementation of “Polly Cracker” public-key 
cryptosystem. Method to share private-key in 
the described “Polly Cracker” implementation 
is introduced in the next section. Procedure for 
sharing particular graph coloring in the graph 
with known structure follows (section 5). 
2. GRAPHS COLORING RESULTS  
Notation: 
G(V,E) is the graph, where V is set of 
vertices and E is set of edges, with e edges and 
v vertices,  
vi denotes ith vertex of the graph, vi  ∈ V,  
Kn is the complete graph on n vertices (the 
graph which has edges connecting all 
vertices),  
χ(G) is the chromatic number of graph G 
(the minimal number of colors needed for 
vertex coloring of the graph). In this section 
graphs G with  are considered, unless 
stated otherwise. All the examples are given 
for 3-colorable graphs.  
nG =χ )(
2.1 Graph description 
Graph G is described by the square 
adjacency matrix . The 
elements of A
mjiaij ,...,2,1,],[ ==A
 satisfy:  
• for ,  if  (vertices vji ≠ 1=ija Evv ji ∈ i, vj 
are connected by an edge) and , 
otherwise; 
0=ija
• for , , where n ∈ Zji = naii = k is the 
number of color assigned to vi. In Zk , k ≥ 
χ(G) denotes the number of colors that can 
be used to color vertices of G (in other 
words, k is the size of the color palette).  
In the case that the graph coloring is not 
considered, k=1, and all entries on A’s main 
diagonal are zero.  
 
Example 1  
Take the graph G with 4 vertices, colored 
with 3 colors:  
 
The adjacency matrix of the graph G (only 
the graph structure, no colors) is:  
0101
1011
0100
1100
4
3
2
1
4321
v
v
v
v
vvvv
, 
while the whole adjacency matrix A with 
encoded coloring is 
1101
1211
0100
1100
4
3
2
1
4321
v
v
v
v
vvvv
 
 
Coloring and the chromatic number are 
integral properties of any graph. Given the 
graph, it is always possible to find its n-
coloring and chromatic number. In the general 
case, this is the problem of NP class, see [10]. 
Both properties cannot be separated from the 
graph structure itself. Hence, one may try to 
use them for own advantage.  
It is worthy to note that color encoding 
provided allows increasing number of graph G 
colorings. Take . Then for every 
proper vertex coloring of the graph G
kGn <χ= )(
 there 
are  colorings of the graph G


n
k  with n colors 
from k-color palette.   
2.2 Coding the matrix A  
A is a symmetric matrix, hence having all 
the entries on the main diagonal and all the 
entries below main diagonal, one can describe 
whole matrix (and as the result graph G). Thus 
it can be written as the sequence 
a21a31a32a41a42a43 ...am(m-1)a11 a22 ...amm, where 
the first binary part (a21a31a32a41a42a43 .. am(m-
1)) corresponds to all the entries below main 
diagonal, while second decimal one (a11 a22 
...amm) to the main diagonal itself.  
 
Example 1 (continuation)  
Coding matrix A we obtain  
1200101110
44332211434241323121 aaaaaaaaaa
0111010021=m
 
that yields               
2.3 Vertex types in graph n-coloring 
In general graph G n-coloring is equivalent 
to partitioning it into n sets of vertices, such 
that vertices in one set are not connected 
(hence n-coloring of such a graph), see [10]. 
 
Definition. The degree of freedom of the 
vertex in graph G for particular coloring is 
numbers of colors that can be assigned to that 
vertex in graph n-coloring. Alternatively one 
can compare all colors excluded for particular 
vertex (vertex is connected with vertices 
having such colors assigned) with all colors 
available for the coloring. 
In the graph G (χ(G) = n) every vertex in 
the graph can be assigned one of the following 
types:  
Type I: fixed vertex with degree of freedom 
equals 1. In all possible graph colorings only 
one color remains for such a vertex. For 
instance, check any vertex in n-coloring of Kn 
graph. 
Type II: fixed vertex with degree of 
freedom equal to y (y < n; y∈N). In all possible 
graph colorings, y colors remain available for 
such a vertex. 
 Example 2 of vertex with the degree of 
freedom y=2 and n=3. On the drawing 
numbers next to vertices denote assigned 
coloring, while corresponding matrix follows. 
  
3/2001
0311
0121
1111
4
3
2
1
4321
v
v
v
v
vvvv
 
 
Type III: slack vertex with the variable 
degree of freedom. The degree of freedom 
depends on the particular graph coloring. 
 
Example 3 of slack vertex (v5) with 
variable degree of freedom for n=3. On the 
drawing numbers next to vertices denote 
assigned coloring, while corresponding 
matrices follow. 
310011
121000
011110
001310
101121
100011
6
5
4
3
2
1
654321
v
v
v
v
v
v
vvvvvv
 
 
310011
12/11000
013110
001110
101121
100011
6
5
4
3
2
1
654321
v
v
v
v
v
v
vvvvvv
 
 
2.4 Reducibility  
Type I vertices form disjoint subgraphs in 
graph G. For every such a subgraph, minimal 
set of vertices that uniquely determine n-
coloring (of the subgraph) can be found. 
Hence, these vertices can be reduced (in the 
coloring sense) to the smaller set.  
The reduced structure is a minimal set of 
type I vertices that uniquely determine n-
coloring for connected graph made of type I 
vertices.  
Example 4 
On the drawing numbers next to vertices 
denote assigned coloring, while corresponding 
matrix follows. 
 
 
200101
010110
003011
110311
011121
101111
6
5
4
3
2
1
654321
v
v
v
v
v
v
vvvvvv
 
 
reduces to (vertices v1v2v3): 
 
311
121
111
3
2
1
321
v
v
v
vvv
  
 
2.5 Remarks on constructing required n-
colorable graphs 
 Rigorous and formal treatment of the 
subject would by far exceed the space 
limitations. Instead, only some ideas and 
sketches of algorithms will be presented.  
Using colors. Knowing graph G, with χ(G) 
= n, one is not restricted to using only n colors 
for the given graph coloring. Graph G can be 
properly colored with any z colors (n ≤ z ≤ |V|, 
z∈N). Colors needed for graph coloring (for 
) can be chosen from much greater 
palette, e.g., k possible colors. Then, the 
number of colors' combinations is simply . 
nG =χ )(



n
k
Toolbox for checking chromatic number 
and constructing required graphs. Some 
theoretical results can help in constructing 
proper graphs for the secret sharing purpose. 
Here we present some of them.  
Theorem. Every graph G of Kn 
configuration has . nG =χ )(
Lemma. Every graph G having a subgraph 
of Kn configuration has χ(G) ≥ n.  
These results set lower bound on χ(G) 
when constructing graph G.  
The Brook’s theorem (1941). If the graph 
G is not an odd circuit or a complete graph, 
then χ(G) ≤ d, where d is the maximum degree 
of a vertex of G.  
The Brook’s theorem sets the upper bound 
on χ(G) when constructing graph G. It is 
useful when building graph G from smaller 
blocks. 
Theorem. When two disjoint graphs G1 
(χ(G1) = n1) and G2  (χ(G2) = n2) are linked by 
any number of edges to form graph G, the 
following holds:  ( ) )()()()(),(max 2121 GGGGG χ+χ≤χ≤χχ . 
One can also use the idea of vertex types 
(see section 2.3) to build an adequate graph. 
Consider two examples of such structures:  
• When graph is built from type I and II 
vertices, result is straight forward 
(although resulting graphs can have higher 
chromatic number, then one used to define 
vertex types). 
• Starting from the graph that vertex types 
are determined and step-by-step adding 
vertices and edges in the way that vertex 
type assessment remains feasible (when 
preceding graph type assignment is 
known). 
3.  POLLY CRACKER  
Consider the particular implementation of 
public-key cryptosystem “Polly Cracker”, that 
uses graph 3-coloring (see [8]). Although 
successful attacks on the general Polly Cracker 
was described in [16] , we decided to use it as 
general illustrative example. We find it as 
convenient vehicle for presenting more general 
concepts and opportunities resulting from 
sharing of graph properties. 
The general idea behind graph based 
implementation of the Polly Cracker scheme is 
as follows:  
a. Construct polynomials over finite field F.  
b. Take an arbitrary vector  as a 
private key and the subset  of the 
polynomials over finite field F, such that, for 
every i, , as a public-key.  
nFz ∈{ }iq=B
0)( =zqi
c. Encrypt a message m obtaining cipher 
polynomial C using the public-key (a 
randomly chosen element generated by B). 
d. Message m can be decrypted by finding the 
value of polynomial C at 
}
z.  
Having described public-key cryptosystem 
“Polly Cracker”, one can move to its special 
case based on graph 3-coloring. The problem 
of graph 3-coloring is NP class (see [10]). To 
formulate the cryptosystem in terms of the 
graph theory, we introduce as the public-key 
the graph , that is the graph with the 
set of vertices V and the set of edges E and, as 
the private key, the proper 3-coloring of the 
graph using colors  and the map 
assigning  for , according to 
graph 3-coloring rule.  
),( EVG
svi a
{ 2,1,0∈s
Vvi ∈
Once graph 3-coloring is known, the base 
 is constructed. B is constructed from 
a polynomial derived from the variables 
)(GBB = { }svt , , 
and  for 321 BBBB ∪∪={ }Vvtv ∈− :12, , { }
tv +1,tB v += 0,1 { }2,1,0, ∈≤ psV: ∈vp,,2 = ttB vsv , { }Ew ∈),ves (:,ttB wsv= ,3   
Then, the zero point of all polynomials 
from B can be computed by taking , if 
the vertex v has color s,
1, =svt
 and 0 otherwise.  
In a similar way other graph based 
“Polly Cracker” schemes can be constructed. 
One of the examples can be “perfect code” 
graph described in [8]. 
All these implementations, like 
described  above graph 3-coloring system, 
have the following features: 
a. Knowing ),( EV
{ }iq=
to knowing 
subset  of polynomials over finite 
field F. 
B
G  is equivalent 
b. Knowing the NP-class problem (resulting 
from the graph structure) is equivalent to 
knowing vector . nFz ∈
c. Encryption takes place like in general 
“Polly Cracker” scheme.  
d. To decrypt message m, a value of the 
received polynomial (derived from the 
graph  structure) at z should be 
calculated. 
),( VEG
The private key is a proper 3-coloring of 
the graph. It is important to note that any 
proper 3-coloring of the graph can be the 
private key. Hence, for the given graph G (the 
public key) there are usually more then one (in 
fact, usually much more) private keys. 
4. SHARING POLLY CRACKER’S 
PRIVATE KEY  
As described in the section 2.2, vertex 
coloring of the graph G can be written as the 
sequence a11 a22 ...amm  with entries from the 
main diagonal of matrix A. To share graph’s 
coloring is to share this sequence (vector). For 
this purpose all secret sharing methods 
suitable to share number can be applied.  
However one should note that information 
contained in the graph structure severely limits 
the secret space. The particular secret space 
needs to be individually examined. 
It should be emphasized that in general case 
one can share only partitioning graph’s 
vertices into n sets (proper n-coloring for the 
graph), where , not a particular color-
to-vertex assignment. It is due to the fact that 
in linear secret sharing scheme any secret 
participant can modify her share adding 
component-wise in Z
)(Gn χ=
k a constant to every digit 
in the number. In such a case:  
a. Particular color-to-vertex assignment will 
be modified. 
b. Partitioning graph’s vertices into n sets 
(proper n-coloring for the graph) will 
remain valid.  
The algorithm for the case when coloring 
with particular color-to-vertex assignment is 
securely shared is described in the section 5. 
The other possibility would arise from using 
nonlinear secret sharing schemes, see [13]. 
To share the Polly Cracker’s private key 
(for the implementation presented in section 3) 
one needs to share proper 3-colouring for the 
graph, which can be done by any of existing 
secret sharing methods (see [11], [12]). To 
illustrate this process authors use KGH. It is to 
be shown that KGHe (all invalid 3-colorings 
are excluded) method can be used for this 
purpose. Finding proper 3-coloring for the 
graph is the problem of NP class, see [10], 
hence finding the private key for Polly Cracker 
is a difficult task.  
Now, assume that KGHe requires co-
operation of t participants to recover the 
secret. Let t-1 participants to pool their shares. 
Then, the result they receive can be changed 
into any element from the secret space (a 
vector of  numbers), when the lacking share 
of the secret is xored (
η
⊕). Set of possible 
values of the last (unknown) share can be 
restricted only when proper 3-colorings of the 
graph are know. But this is the secret that is 
being shared !!! 
When the secret is not known, xor (⊕) of t-
1 shares reveals no information about the 
secret number and does not help to find the 
private key. 
It is interesting to note that, in order to 
recover the private key, secret shares have to 
add up (⊕) to any proper graph 3-coloring. 
While designing the scheme’s implementation 
(graph for the public key) one can usually 
compute its proper colorings much easier (see 
section 2.5) than from average ready-made 
graph. This fact opens new possibility for 
designing access structures. For instance, 
although different sets of authorized 
participants retrieve different secrets, so secret 
sharing scheme looks like multi-secret 
threshold schemes, see [11], each of different 
secrets has the same functionality, being a 
valid private key for a particular Polly Cracker 
implementation.  
5. SHARING PARTICULAR GRAPH 
COLORING IN THE GRAPH WITH 
KNOWN STRUCTURE 
The graph G, build of type I and type II 
vertices (see section 2.3), will be used to 
propose a secret sharing method. Type 
assignment is equivalent to partitioning graph 
G into n sets of vertices, such that vertices in 
one set are not connected (hence, finding n-
coloring of such a graph). Particular graph n-
coloring (color-to-vertex assignment), with 
colors taken from predefined k-color palette, is 
the secret to be shared.  
There are two separate pieces of the secret 
that can be shared independently: type I 
vertices coloring and type II vertices coloring. 
If only one of the parts is reconstructed, the 
rest still remains a secret. Certainly, it is 
possible to find a finite set of possible secret 
values, but its cardinality (size) can be decided 
during the implementation, to meet required 
security level. 
 First, method to share coloring for both 
vertex types will be supplied. It is strongly 
recommended to read this part of the paper 
simultaneously with example 5 that follows. 
References to the particular steps of the 
example are given. Although proposed 
approach works with many secret sharing 
methods, again KGH is used in discussion. 
5.1 Sharing the coloring of type I vertices 
To start the procedure, find reduced 
structure for type I vertices in the graph G (see 
section 2.4). Each vertex vi from the reduced 
structure is assigned a color  from Zs
{ ,...,2
k, k ≥ 
χ(G) 
}
= n (see section 2.4). Certainly, only n 
out of k colors can be used at once. The 
reduced structure can be written as the vector 
of  r numbers  (where 
, are colors assigned to the 
vertices v
rr sssS ,1=
rjZs kj ,...,2,1, =∈
i in the reduced structure; vertices are 
written in ascending order with respect to the 
index i). 
 First case, when χ(G) = n=k will be 
discussed. In this situation vertices in the 
reduced structure are assigned colors from Zn. 
Let's name such an assignment “Zn encoding 
for the graph G”. There are at least n! of Zn 
encodings for the graph  G. Clearly, an 
attacker can easily determine n-coloring of 
vertices from reduced structure, but will not 
know particular Zn encoding for the graph G. 
To share it KGHe can be used. “Full” KGH 
cannot be applied, because vertices in the 
reduced structure, which are linked by the 
common edge, must have different colors. 
Using the same reasoning as in the section 4, it 
can be shown that xor (⊕) of any unauthorized 
set of shares (even just below the threshold) 
reveals no information about secret and does 
not help to find Zn encoding for the graph G.   
 Second case arise when k > χ(G) = n. In 
such a situation, secret that is being shared, 
consists of  particular  colors combination 
and their particular permutation (color-to-
vertex assignment for every v



n
k
i). In such a case 
the following routine is applied: 
Algorithm 1: for coloring vertices of type 
I 
1. Proper n-coloring of the graph G is known. 
2. The reduced structure for  type I vertices in 
the graph G (see section 2.4) is found. 
3. Let’s name all numbers in the particular 
 colors combination, used to color 
graph G



n
k
{ ,1,0
{ ,1,0
, as “particular n colors from Zk”. 
First put them in the ascending order 
applying ordering principle for N (natural 
numbers). Next particular n colors from Zk 
are assigned numbers from the set 
. This is done by staring from 
the smallest element in the set of the 
particular  colors combination and 
using consecutive numbers from set 
 to enumerate consecutive 
colors (numbers). Once this is done, the 
mapping between particular n colors from 
Z
}1,...,2 −n


n
k
}1,...,2 −n


k and Zn is established. 
4. Once the mapping is known, the Zn 
encoding for the graph G is determined. 
end // for coloring vertices of type I 
Discussion: When the Zn encoding for the 
graph G is known and can be shared using 
KHGe as described above. To see this routine 
at work, check step 1 in the example 5. 
5.2 Sharing the coloring of type II 
vertices 
remark: When k > χ(G) = n, if Technical 
type II vertices coloring (one piece of the 
secret) was found, particular  colors 
combination encoded in type I vertices would 
not be a secret any more. 



n
k
To avoid it, colors from Zk should be 
replaced by the colors from Zn. This is done 
using Zk to Zn mapping found for type I 
vertices above. So, the case when k > χ(G) = 
n, can be reduced to the case  χ(G) = k = n.  
Having type II vertices  assigned colors 
from Zn, arise some other problems : 
1. When type II vertices coloring (one piece 
of the secret ) is known, one can deduce type I 
vertices coloring (or, at least, severely limit the 
number of available possibilities).  
2. No good routine is known for 
quantitative analysis of the method’s security 
parameters. 
To address these problems, type II vertices 
have to be converted into more convenient 
form. 
For type II vertices define: 
a. ni is the number of colors excluded for 
the particular vertex vi. It is obtained by 
checking vertices of type I that are linked to vi. 
Clearly, every color that is assigned to any 
vertex linked to vi is excluded from the list of 
available colors.  
b. li is the number of the colors available for 
the vertex vi , li = n - ni . 
c. . { }1,...,2,1,0 −= il lZ i
d. Ci is the set of li colors from Zn, that are 
available for the vertex vi . 
e. w is the number of type II vertices in the 
graph G. 
For practical instances of the terms defined 
above  see step 2 in the example 5. 
Due to the fact that graph G is properly n-
colored using colors from Zn , each vertex vi 
has assigned a color from Ci. Note that 
ili Z C =
ilZ
, hence one-to-one mapping between 
 and Ci can be defined. 
Algorithm 2: for  and C
ilZ i one-to-one 
mapping  
For every particular type II vertex vi do: 
a. Put elements of  and C
il
Z i in ascending 
order applying ordering principle for N.  
b. Once elements in Ci and  are ordered, 
they can be labeled (enumerated). This is 
done by starting from the smallest element 
in C
il
Z
i } and using consecutive numbers from  for consecutive ordered 
elements from C
{ 1,...,2,1,0 −il
{ ,...,2,1,0
ilZ
i. 
ilZ
wS
c. When described in previous point (b) 
routine is completed, mapping between Ci}  and  is found. Hence, 
mapping between C
1−il
il
Z
i and Z is also known. 
This allows to express v
il
i coloring in terms 
of colors from , for each vi. 
end // for  and Ci one-to-one mapping 
Discussion: To see algorithm at work, 
consult step 3 in the example 5.  
Note that a color from Zn assigned to 
particular vertex vi of type II, can be encoded 
by any number from  with equal 
probability. So, type II vertices coloring using 
does not provided any information on Z
ilZ
ilZ n 
encoding for the graph G. Hence, it is obvious 
that such a single number si (particular vi color 
taken from ), can be shared using KGH. 
The sequence of w such numbers, that yields 
the vector  can be also shared by KGH. 
This concludes the part concerning sharing the 
coloring of type II vertices. 
 
5.3 Interaction between secrets resulting 
from different types of vertices 
Now is time for few comments on 
situations, when one of the pieces of the secret 
(coloring for one of vertex types) is known. To 
describe it, two cases will be discussed: 
1. Secret information for type II vertices 
was recovered. Then, there are at least n! 
particular color assignments for type I vertices. 
No information about particular  
combination or Z




n
k


n
k


n encoding for the graph G 
can be derived from known coloring of type II 
vertices. 
2. Secret information for type I vertices was 
recovered. Then, there are possibilities 
to assign available colors to type II vertices, 
∏
=
η
1i
i   a
where . Knowing 
type I vertices coloring one can only determine 
available colors for each of type II vertices, 
but has no information about which of the 
colors is chosen.  

=
otherwise1
 verticesII for typei
i
l
a
000000
101100
500100
061000
015110
101201
001020
000105
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
654321 vvvvvv
Example 5 of sharing particular graph 
coloring in the graph with known structure. 
Take the 3-colorable graph, colors are 
assigned from Z10. 
 
 
The matrix A for the given graph is:  
 
51
16
01
00
01
01
00
00
87
v
v
v
v
v
v
v
v
vv
 
 
and the matrix A coding yields:  
010011000100100001101000000152256565   
step 1: 
Type I vertices: v3 v4 v6 v7  yield the reduced 
structure: v3 v4 v7. Mappings Z10 into Z3 are 
defined: v3=0, v4=1, v7=2 (all in Z3), yield 
2→0, 5 →1, 6 →2. Hence, Z3 encoding for the 
graph is v3 v4 v7 → 012. 
step 2: 
Type II vertices: v1 v2 v5 v8 , colors 
assignment from Z10 to Z3 is: v1 =5 →1, v2 =2 
→0, v5 =6 →2 v8 =5 →1. So, v1 v2 v5 v8  
corresponds to 1021 in Z3 encoding. 
Sets of numbers from Z3 excluded for 
particular vertex: v1 {0}, v2 {1}, v5 {1}, v8 
 {2}. 
of numbers from Z3 available for the 
particular vertex: v1 ∈ C1={1,2}, v2∈C2={0,2}, 
v5∈ C5={0,2}, v8 ∈ C8={0,1}. 
In this example li =2 for each of vertices: v1 
v2 v5 v8 , hence ilZ = Z2. 
step 3: 
For v1  mapping Z3 → Z2  is defined {1,2} 
→{0,1}, hence 1→0 and 2→1. 
For v2,v5  mapping Z3 → Z2  is defined {0,2} 
→{0,1}, hence 0→0 and 2 →1. 
For v8  mapping Z3 → Z2  is defined {0,1} 
→{0,1}, hence 0→0 and 1 →1. 
Finally, v1 v2 v5 v8  corresponds to 0011 in Z2 
encoding. 
Hence, for the given graph G the number to 
be shared is 0011256, where 0011 corresponds 
to type II vertices and 256 corresponds to the 
reduced structure of type I vertices. The first 
part of the number can be shared by "full" 
KGH. The second part of the number has to be 
shared by KGHe, since some of the vertex 
pairs in the reduced structure must have 
different colors. 
Now it is time to calculate numbers for 
described above cases when one of the pieces 
of the secret is known. 
Case 1.  3! = 720 = 6! 

 3
10    
Case 2. There are 4 type II vertices: v1 v2 v5 
v8 and for each li = 2, hence ∏
=
=
8
1
42
i
i   a  
In both cases numbers do not seem to be 
impressive, but in a general case they can be 
made as big as required during the 
implementation.                
To recover secret the following algorithm 
has to be applied. It works independently 
whether k> χ(G) or k=χ(G)=n. In the later 
case just substitute k by n in the routine 
description and skip all references to the 
mapping Zk and Zn. 
Algorithm 3:  secret recovery: 
1. Authorized participants pool the shares → 
secret number for the graph (0011256 in 
example above) is obtained. 
2. Secret number is used to: 
a. establish colors from Zk for the reduced 
structure, this also yields coloring using Zn 
colors (remember that both subsets are 
ordered in N), 
b. once the reduced structure coloring is Sets 
known, coloring for all type I vertices is 
established, 
c. establish  colors from   for vertices of 
type II. 
ilZ
3. Using  coloring of type I vertices, Ci for 
every type II vertex vi is found. 
4. For each vertex of type II determine its Zn 
color, using and C
ilZ i (remember that both 
subsets are ordered in N). 
5. For all type II vertices, Zk colors are 
assigned using their Zn colors and known Zk 
to Zn mapping. 
Upon completing procedure, the secret 
(particular n-coloring for the known graph, 
using k-color palette) is recovered.  
end. // secret recovery 
Remark I: 
The method described in this section works 
in graphs with type I and II vertices. 
Addressing issue of vertices of type III, 
although easy in some special instances, seems 
to be difficult in general case and requires 
further research. 
Remark II:  
Restriction of the method to vertices of type 
I and II does not seem so harmful having in 
mind tools that are available for the designer 
of the graph and secret sharing scheme (see 
section 2.5) 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this paper, we have shown how to share 
graph vertex coloring. Although we used KGH 
scheme as the example, all secret traditional 
sharing methods, that are used to share secrets 
consisting of numbers, can be applied.  
Further research will concentrate on sharing 
of other graph related properties (e.g., 
Hamiltonian paths, graphs isomorphism) for 
graphs with known structure. 
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